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In the early years of the twentieth century, American reformers 
adopted the new techniques of professionalism as a means of coping with 
the enormous problems of urban life.1 This commitment placed the 
reformers in a difficult position. On the one hand, they were formulating 
intricate schemes that demanded highly-specialized knowledge and skills, 
schemes that were normally best implemented by a technical elite; on 
the other, they had to submit their proposals to public scrutiny in order 
to win the consent of voters who were ignorant and often suspicious of 
their theories, their data and their motives. This tension between 
democracy and expertise plagued the reformers for years, and led them 
to experiment with various methods of exerting political leverage to put 
their programs across. 
Historians have shown how the new professionals met this situation 
by working directly on the seats of power,2 and by aligning themselves 
with economic elites to insulate the mechanisms of decision-making from 
grass-roots pressures.3 But these explanations concentrate on the institu-
tions of power, and do not reveal how the reformers came to grips with 
the deepest level of their dilemma: the instability that was the very 
essence of the system. For there was simply no assurance that today's 
friendly decision-makers would not be turned out at tomorrow's election, 
leaving the professionals and their programs at the mercy of a hostile 
new government. 
The problem then was inherent in democracy itself—in a political 
system that compelled the experts periodically to gain the approval of 
an uninformed electorate. Stated this way, of course, the solution was 
plain to see. If the problem was an uninformed public, then all the 
professionals had to do was inform it, the assumption being that as soon 
as everybody knew what they alone now knew, there would no longer 
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be a problem. But that only confirmed the dilemma. How could they 
communicate information and theories that were at odds with the 
common fund of knowledge about how the world worked? How could 
they win popular support for programs that defied popular under-
standing? 
The modernization of public health illustrates the problem con-
fronting these reformers. Before the 1880s the public health movement 
had been guided by the "dirt theory," which held that communicable 
diseases originated somehow in decayed organic matter. The movement 
was often led by sanitation engineers, and emphasized plumbing, sewer-
age and fumigation as the basic deterrents to disease. These methods 
contributed to the growing control over epidemics, and no doubt had 
a benign effect upon the aromatic qualities of industrial cities, but they 
were limited in the long run by the very theory that sustained them.4 
Public health activities took a new turn in the 1890s, when the germ 
theory of disease caught on. Thereafter the profession grew rapidly. 
The explosion of research on both sides of the Atlantic led the American 
Public Health Association (APHA) to set up a Laboratory Section in 
1899 to serve as a clearing house for the vast accumulation of knowledge 
that followed. By the early 1900s public health officials were stressing 
care of the person and the physical environment as the primary deterrents 
to disease. The growing interest in the demography of births, disease 
and deaths raised questions about the social distribution of morbidity 
and mortality, and led to the creation of a section of vital statistics by 
the Association in 1906. Soon, as the social implications of public health 
came more clearly into focus, the APHA established a Sociological 
Section, on a trial basis at first, and finally in 1910 as a permanent section. 
By then the profession was carving itself into areas of specialization where 
experts were beginning to have difficulty communicating with each other, 
let alone with the general public. 
The story was much the same in the other professions. The settlement-
house workers of the 1890s helped transform the nineteenth-century 
charity movement, with its emphasis on personal moral responsibility, 
into the modern field of social work, with its emphasis on the environ-
mental causes of human misery. Guided by the National Conference of 
Charities and Corrections (NCCC), social work soon produced its own 
experts in housing, family, factory and recreational problems, and was 
gradually built into university courses in which theory and research 
techniques carried as much weight as straight information. At the same 
time, city planning evolved from landscape architecture. It moved from 
its original concern with parks, monuments and civic centers (the "City 
Beautiful") in the 1890s, to an organic concept of the city as a variety of 
interrelated physical and social phenomena, around each of which an 
area of specialization grew. The movement was institutionalized in the 
National Conference on City Planning (NCCP), founded in 1909, and 
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in the university courses in city planning that fanned outward from 
Boston in the twentieth century. 
Unfortunately, while the designs of reform were impressive enough 
to the designers, they were not always warmly received in the urban 
slums. Public health officials, for instance, who worked constantly 
among the immigrant poor, were often frustrated by cultural barriers. 
In 1910 a visiting nurse told of a Syrian couple in Cleveland who could 
not afford to buy a much-needed ten-cent yarn truss for their baby because 
they were already starving themselves to save fourteen dollars for the 
infant's christening and for the celebration that would follow. The 
nurse could not understand the parents because she was acting on a 
professional commitment that called for technical solutions to patholog-
ical conditions. The parents resisted the nurse because they proceeded 
from priorities that were deeply embedded in cultural traditions. There 
was simply no way to reconcile these viewpoints.5 
The economic problems of the poor were a hindrance also. There 
were many tubercular patients who felt that they could not afford to leave 
work for the bed rest that was prescribed. Yet in the eyes of health offi-
cials, who were at war with a contagious killer, prolonged isolation and 
bed rest were minimal prescriptions. Other families took lodgers into 
their already-cramped quarters to supplement meager incomes. For them 
it was a matter of economic survival. For housing reformers and health 
officials, however, this lodger evil only compounded all of the problems 
that were related to population congestion, and contributed to a social 
situation that was dangerously volatile, and had to be brought under 
control.6 
Behind these specific problems of outlook and income lay the more 
general problem of a political system in which short-term elections 
threatened to disrupt long-term programs. That is precisely what hap-
pened when the Los Angeles Health Department demanded that tuber-
culin tests be given to the cows that supplied milk for the city. The issue 
was brought to referendum in 1912, and when it was defeated the editors 
of the American Journal of Public Health were outraged. They con-
demned a system which permitted "agitators" to mislead an ignorant 
public on vital health questions.7 
The need to shield an educated elite from political sniping was a 
recurrent theme among the professionals. They longed for autonomy 
but knew that they would have to settle for less. One New Jersey health 
official proposed a compromise in which health programs would be 
coordinated under a single executive with full power to hire and fire his 
subordinates. Yet even that system, he noted, might run afoul of demo-
cratic impulses. Perfunctorily he conceded that popular rule was 
"fundamentally desirable," but then he warned that 
no one who advocates democratic government carried to its ex-
treme should forget that rule by the people, especially in a large 
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city . . . gives the most ignorant foreigner lately naturalized an 
equal vote on health-protective matters with the physician, the 
engineer and the sanitarian who has given all his mature years 
to the study of measures for the conservation and prolongation of 
human life. 
The only way to protect the health official from "sinister influences/' he 
concluded, was to proceed through a broad program of public health 
instruction.8 One way or another, all of the reformers reached the same 
conclusion. 
For that reason they set out to build a reservoir of support for their 
programs by educating the public. At first, however, few of them had a 
clear idea what they meant either by "educate" or "public." Specific 
suggestions did not usually push beyond such time-honored methods 
as press campaigns and school programs. These techniques played a 
significant role over the years, but alongside the urgency felt by the 
professionals they were agonizingly slow. 
Gradually the reformers began to experiment with other modes of 
informing and influencing public opinion more rapidly. A landmark 
in this process was the New York "Congestion Show" of 1908, which was 
sponsored by the Committee on the Congestion of Population in New 
York. The Committee was founded in 1907 as the brainchild of several 
New York social workers, and was soon supported by the leading social 
agencies of the city. To build sentiment for population decentralization 
the Committee concentrated on dramatizing the evils of congestion in a 
wide assortment of graphic displays at the exhibit. Mel Scott describes 
how the Metropolitan Parks Association 
exhibited a large map upon which small shot, each representing 
one person, was scattered and piled to show the density of popu-
lation. On the lower part of Manhattan the shot was neaped up 
and running over the fences used to hold it in place, whereas in 
great areas on the outskirts it was 'scattered thin as flowers in 
meadows.'9 
The imagery here suggests precisely the visual impact that the map was 
intended to have. 
The following year a group of businessmen formulated a plan for 
the civic and social regeneration of Boston. Concerned initially with 
the future prosperity of the city, they worked through business, civic 
and professional organizations, and soon enlisted the support of such 
reform leaders as Edward Filene, Louis D. Brandeis and Dr. Richard 
Cabot in their efforts to educate the public to support the "Boston-1915" 
movement. The campaign was launched with an exhibition designed to 
draw large crowds to its colorful displays. One of these displays repro-
duced a North-end tenement apartment with its "rusty, partly broken 
stove, dirty floor . . . rickety beds with noticeably soiled coverings," and 
the other accoutrements necessary "to present a truly vivid picture of 
actual slum life." Next to this was a model apartment with a bathroom. 
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It was "all clean and decent/' and could be built, according to the re-
formers, to rent for very little more than the slum flat. The show was 
filled with similar exhibits "of real interest to the people—to everyday 
folks who don't care a toothpick about statistics and deep sentences. . . ."10 
The Congestion Show and the Boston-1915 exhibition marked the 
direction in which efforts to sway the public were moving. Issues whose 
deepest implications were often too complicated to explain to the average 
citizen, and too important to expose to counter-pressures, were presented 
in symbolic forms to reach behind consciousness and stir a favorable 
emotional response. 
The reformers apparently worked out many of their early ventures 
in publicity on a trial-and-error basis, but from time to time they were 
given instruction by experts in advertising theory. In 1908, Edward Shaw, 
the managing editor of the Washington, D.C. Times, advised the social 
and charity workers gathered at the NCCC that their appeals for popular 
support would be more effective in the form of human interest stories 
aimed frankly at the emotions. Charity workers, he said, should learn 
from advertising men how to utilize the principles of modern scientific 
psychology, because the average person was simply not interested in dull 
facts or technical procedures.11 The reformers were abreast of him, how-
ever, for at that same conference they established a section on press and 
publicity to advise social workers on just such matters. 
Almost immediately this new section set out to spread the gospel of 
advertising as a means of softening the public for social programs. In 
1909, John Kingsbury informed the NCCC that social publicity differed 
from commercial advertising only in its need to be moral and truthful, 
and he blurred even that distinction when he encouraged the social 
workers to emphasize "the harrowing human details," which he said 
were the essential truth of a case, whenever they prepared a human 
interest release for the press.12 
In the next few years health officials moved ahead of the other profes-
sionals in the sophistication of their approach to publicity. What was 
the purpose of employing advertising techniques? According to a New 
York physician, it was to persuade people to live a sanitary life "of their 
own accord."13 What was the best way of going about it? According to 
a New Jersey health official, it was by applying the lessons that advertising 
men had learned from the new science of psychology. The advantage of 
this approach, he said, was that it eliminated the need for complex 
explanations: 
Publicity rarely allows of details. Even the highly educated and 
rapid reader will not stop to peruse a circular or poster of more 
than say a hundred words. . . . The most effective advertisements 
of the day are those which rely upon a single phrase or even a 
single apt word for their effect.14 
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In other words, health officials could put their message across more 
forcefully with slogans than with information. 
Late in the Progressive era this trend was effectively summarized by 
Edward Moree, a prominent charity worker. Moree claimed flatly that 
"publicity properly applied will save more lives than any other single 
agency employed by health workers." The goal was to "change the lives 
and habits of the people or to focus or re-focus public opinion." First, 
however, the health official would have to "get (people) to think in the 
right way." Like a businessman with a new brand of baked beans, he 
said, the health worker had a new product to sell. Obviously the merchant 
would never put his beans on the market without first hiring an adver-
tising expert to prepare the public for them. The health official, he con-
cluded, would be wise to adopt the same policy and employ a professional 
advertising agency to cultivate the public for his own ends—to "get them 
to think in the right way." That was "publicity properly applied."15 
Moree took ideas that had been implicit in the notion of publicity and 
integrated them into a system explicitly designed to engineer consent 
for public projects, and ultimately to regulate human behavior. 
The idea of progressivism as social control, of course, has become a 
major theme among historians in recent years. Certainly the schemes 
devised by the new professionals to bring order to the turbulent cities 
place them squarely at the center of this impulse. In one sense their 
publicity work was simply an adjunct to the process, but there is more to 
it than that. 
The reformers were already wary of the gouging tactics of the 
political cockpit. Under the tutelage of prophets like Moree they dis-
covered how to cope with this peril. They learned that it paid to 
advertise; they learned that modern advertising was based upon a new 
psychology which emphasized the non-rational sources of human be-
havior;16 and above all they learned that influencing the public, like 
protecting it, was too delicate a task to entrust to amateurs. In time they 
came to believe that democracy could be made to work for them through 
professionally-calculated appeals to unreason, that social control could 
be effected through psychological manipulation as well as through 
legislation and outright coercion. The political implications of this 
lesson emerged more clearly in the next decade. 
Before that, however, the war intervened and brought a welcome 
reprieve to the professionals. In the past they had been forced to 
struggle for recognition of their plans and to beg for the meager public 
funds available to carry them out. Now their services were suddenly in 
demand to design army camps and housing projects, and to implement 
crash programs in health and sanitation for the new military and 
industrial armies. Above the turmoil stood the Federal Government, 
approving projects and dispensing funds. Liberated at last from the 
need to justify their ideas to an uncomprehending public, sanitation and 
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housing experts, health workers, city planners, architects, municipal 
engineers and social workers all pitched in with great enthusiasm and 
encouraging results. 
Parallel to this development was the major contribution made to the 
war effort by the advertising industry. George Creel used advertising 
men with striking success in his Committee on Public Information to 
whip up popular support for wartime policies. As a result they had 
grown in public regard as well as self-esteem, and came out of the war 
with the firm conviction that they could sell practically anything to 
practically anybody.17 
The success of advertising in the war only confirmed what the pro-
fessionals had learned about it earlier in the decade. Thus when the 
war ended and they returned to the massive problems of the cities, when 
their Federal benefactors faded from the scene and they were forced to 
bid anew for public support, education once again became an integral 
part of their activities, and advertising represented more than ever their 
guideline to education. 
In addition they began to perceive the awesome potential of the 
new electronic media of communications after the war. Actually they had 
been dabbling with films since about 1910, when health publicists had 
produced "The Acrobatic Fly" for distribution to nickelodeons around 
the Chicago area. Now they plunged ahead with characteristic thorough-
ness. In 1921 the NCCP set up a Committee on Moving Pictures, and 
was soon promoting films that demonstrated how a dismal "before" could 
be transformed into a Utopian "after" by planning. At about the same 
time, the APHA meetings began to feature colloquia on the use of films 
in health publicity. Speakers at these sessions regularly cautioned pub-
licists about the ignorance of the people who saw health movies, and 
urged them to produce films with that in mind. They recommended the 
use of animation, for example, to hold the attention of audiences that 
would otherwise be alienated by filmed sermons on health.18 Even social 
workers began to employ the media, and by mid-decade were producing 
radio programs that played up the dramatic aspect of social problems.19 
By the 1920s the long apprenticeship in publicity methods was over, 
and the professionals initiated information programs all over the nation. 
City planning came into its own for the first time as cities large and small 
adopted plans, and then devised programs to sell their plans to concerned 
citizens. In 1921 the Chicago Planning Commission deluged the city's 
clergymen with "Seed Thoughts for Sermons," a publication that 
described how city planning would benefit church social work. A year 
later planners in Buffalo sponsored a contest for children to name the 
major boulevard of the Buffalo plan. The idea behind the contest was 
that when a boy "gets father to help him find a name . . . father, in 
hunting for a name, gets sold on the proposition."20 Leaders of the 
Kessler Plan Association of Dallas, aware of the instability of democratic 
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politics, in 1927 sought to create a source of perpetual support b) 
authorizing a civics textbook for the schools that would "establish the 
right mind set" for planning in future generations. 
Health officials approached publicity with somewhat more flair than 
planners. They produced increasingly sophisticated screenplays through 
the decade, and made extensive use of animated cartoons such as "Jinks," 
which told the story of an unemployed worker who dreamed one night 
that "Mike Robe" was about to infest his lungs because he had been 
careless in his health habits. He awoke thoroughly chastised, and vowed 
to turn over a new leaf in personal hygiene. The American Journal of 
Public Health commented that "the film is an excellent example of happy 
treatment of a subject which has too often been made mordid."21 
In order to get through to the nation's youth, health reformers also 
found it useful to exploit a variety of contemporary trends. In a strange 
but timely metaphor, the Indiana Board of Health proclaimed to school-
children that "Your Body is the Automobile of Your Soul," and then 
drew long parallel lists between people and cars: good gasoline/good 
food; clear headlights/good eyes; sound brakes/self control. Two years 
later the Indianapolis Tuberculosis League assisted the local Y.W.C.A. in 
drawing up a series of posters to publicize the merits of a good diet. One 
of the posters recommended prunes and oranges for good complexions; 
another praised onions as "Eye Sparklers"; a third prescribed celery and 
radishes as "Vanity Brushes for the teeth." By far the most effective of 
these "Beauty Hint" posters showed graphically how beets act as a natural 
lipstick. Officials were delighted as they watched beet sales soar at the 
"Y" cafeteria in the next few days. The fruit and vegetable crusade was 
a mixed blessing, however, because as beet sales climbed, meat sales 
plunged. Alarmed at this development, a cook, who had clearly caught 
the spirit of the campaign, proposed a sure-fire remedy: simply turn out a 
series of meat posters.22 The purpose of this publicity effort was to 
promote good health through sound nutrition, yet nothing in the posters 
spoke either of health or nutrition. Instead they advertised food as 
cosmetics; the appeal was to vanity, not health. 
The career of Herman Bundesen in the 1920s illustrates many of the 
problems encountered by the professionals, and some of the solutions 
they worked out. Dr. Bundesen, who was the director of the Chicago 
Board of Health, fused the zeal of a missionary with the talents of a 
carnival barker in his trailblazing efforts to publicize health methods. 
He was already well known locally and in the profession for his radio 
talks on public health when he concocted a stunt in mid-decade that 
opened eyes everywhere. He wanted to teach the public a lesson about 
the food value of milk, and hit upon the startling idea of fueling a 
locomotive entirely with milk, and having it pull a five-car train for 
six miles. The deed was picked up by over one hundred newspapers in 
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the nation, and was perhaps the most successful single stroke of health 
publicity in the decade. 
Public health officials were jubilant over this kind of publicity. One 
of them used it to support his plea for more "salesmanship" and "adver-
tising" in health matters, advertising of the same sort, he said, that sold 
cars, chewing gum, cigarettes and soap.23 Of course the stunt had no 
more to do with the growing body of expertise in the young field of 
nutrition than the vegetable posters at the Indianapolis "Y", but that is 
exactly the point. Its whole purpose was to popularize milk without 
bringing technical information before the public. It was just what health 
publicists were striving for. 
In the next few years Bundesen's fortunes veered sharply back and 
forth. In 1926 he received the "Beneficial Action" award of the Chicago 
Daily News for his work on behalf of clean milk. A year later he was out 
of a job, the victim of a political purge by Mayor Thompson, who had 
only recently been called back into office by the voters of Chicago. The 
incident infuriated professional health workers, and brought home to 
them once again the folly of mixing politics with science. In 1928 Bunde-
sen gained some satisfaction when he was elected president of the APHA. 
In his presidential address he acknowledged that science would probably 
continue to "outstrip public knowledge," and proposed that his colleagues 
meet the situation with an all-out effort to "sell" public health by any 
means available—by "the motion pictures, the radio, slogan and poster, 
or in any other way you will. But sell it."24 
By the end of the decade the professionals were reasonably confident 
that they knew how to educate, and were working out a more refined 
notion of whom to educate as well. The city engineer of Wichita, for 
example, addressed his professional peers, who commonly worked hand-
in-hand with city planners, and instructed them in the techniques of 
public relations. The first step was to flatter community leaders and 
curry the support of local newspapers. After that, he said, they should 
broaden their base of support by being regular fellows in the eyes of 
the working class, and by committing themselves actively to church, civic 
and fraternal organizations.25 Public health officials also began to pitch 
their appeals to organized community forces, when they learned that 
chambers of commerce, parent-teacher groups and women's clubs could 
all be engaged to support public measures in terms of their own group 
interest. 
Virginia Wing, of Cleveland's Social Work Publicity Council, intro-
duced social workers to an even more advanced conception of the public. 
Census data, she told them, were extremely valuable in identifying 
nationality groups and population drifts. Once this information was 
gathered, it could be correlated with statistics on the distribution of 
disease, prostitution and delinquency in order to come to a better under-
standing of social problems, and to develop "a new form of social 
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publicity and education."26 The following year she returned to the 
conference to describe a recent publicity campaign for a new hospital in 
Cleveland. "Moving people to action," she said, "means separating the 
basis of the campaign into its parts, and organizing each part so that it 
will appeal to the motor nerves of the general public." In fact what she 
meant was not the "general public," but a variety of discrete publics. Her 
organization had made separate appeals to the Chamber of Commerce in 
terms of business that would be generated, to labor in terms of jobs that 
would be created, to women's clubs in terms of civic improvements that 
would be made, and to politicians in terms of votes that would be won, 
although the object of the campaign had nothing to do with business, or 
jobs, or civic improvements, or votes. A committee was formed that 
included "all the sources of power, nationality groups, etc., so that the 
letterhead has someone on it from every force." The committee directed 
a campaign that used all kinds of printed materials, newspaper publicity, 
radio propaganda and stunts, such as having a blimp fly over the city to 
advertise the project. The campaign was a smashing success and Cleve-
land got its hospital.27 
Many of these themes were orchestrated near the end of the decade by 
H. A. Overstreet in a paper that he presented to the NCCP. Overstreet 
asserted that "most people do not act from their reasoning power but 
from their emotions," and that the emotions can be harnessed by 
appealing to such instincts as self-preservation, acquisitiveness and com-
petition. Since the average person visualizes ideas better than he thinks 
them, pictures should play a major role in channeling these instinctual 
wants. Moreover, people can be conditioned to accept what they might 
otherwise question: 
Advertisers have long since learned that mere repetition has an 
almost compelling effect. . . . The same thing should be true in 
matters of public welfare. Say 'city planning' enough times and 
people will take it for granted that city planning is one of the 
accepted procedures in our civilization. 
Once these principles are mastered, said Overstreet, the city planning 
publicist must learn to apply them through the voluntary associations 
that abound in American society, for it is in them that power is centered. 
"When an individual is purely an individual," he said, "he is about as 
powerless as any being can possibly be." Organizations as different as 
Tammany Hall and the League of Women Voters knew this, and it was 
time that city planners profited from the experience of such groups.28 
As the Twenties drew to a close, people like Wing and Overstreet 
were bringing Edward Moree's pre-war suggestions up to date with the 
latest thinking and research about opinion formation, and were beaming 
the message clearly and often to new professionals across the land. 
It is tempting to explain these developments as an expression of the 
ethos of a business culture, and let it go at that. Certainly we would not 
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be off the mark in doing so for the 1920s. But they reveal a different 
aspect, and a much larger meaning, if we view them instead as an 
American variant of the world-wide phenomenon of modernization. 
Although theorists differ over precisely how to define this term, most of 
them would agree that it embraces urbanization and the vast expansion 
of new kinds of knowledge, and that when modernization challenges the 
established institutions and beliefs of a society it generally leads to 
political dislocation and readjustment, as new groups reach out for 
power.29 We recognize this process readily enough in the third world, 
where it so often erupts with volcanic force, but in the United States, 
where modernization unfolded without the dramatic intensity of revolu-
tionary upheaval, its wider implications went almost unnoticed for 
decades. Only in recent years have historians begun to use this concept 
widely in discussing twentieth-century America.30 The tension between 
democracy and expertise, and the adjustment they made to each other, 
seem clearly to have been a phase in this process. 
Democracy, after all, had matured in the nineteenth century as the 
political framework of a diffuse agrarian society. It was rooted in egalitar-
ian values, guided by a chronic fear of centralized power, and regulated 
by periodic elections in which candidates debated issues with information 
that was accessible to everybody. That was the theory at any rate, and if 
realities never fulfilled the ideal, they never completely lost contact with 
it either. 
The new professionals, on the other hand, emerged in response to the 
urban crisis of the 1890s. In a society which believed that democratic 
politics depended upon democratic information, they trafficked in knowl-
edge that was inscrutable to the general public. Nothing had prepared the 
common man to believe that sickness and death were caused by plants 
and animals that were present everywhere but visible nowhere. Nothing 
had prepared him to grasp the dense mathematical formulae that deter-
mined the amount of open space necessary, so the planners said, to end 
urban congestion. The experts might lay out the arcane facts and theories 
of their programs to an upper tier of civic leaders, but they knew that 
they could not get through to the urban masses on those terms. On the 
whole, their activities would have been better served by protection from 
periodic elections than by exposure to them, but that was out of the 
question. Instead they would have to bend the system somehow to their 
own needs. 
Thus it was a political imperative that sent the new professionals out 
to woo the public. Early in the century they felt their way toward a 
strategy designed to engage the feelings more than to inform the 
intellect. That was the hidden implication of the splashy Congestion 
Show of 1908, and the Boston-1915 exhibition, where they used the 
symbolic representation of issues to evade the systematic presentation of 
issues. In that respect the publicity efforts of the professionals broke 
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completely from their commitment to the rational evaluation of scientific 
data. 
Soon they began to absorb ideas from other new areas of expertise 
quite unlike their own. Technicians and tinkerers were experimenting 
with new modes of communication; psychologists were probing for the 
roots of human behavior; advertising men were discovering how to 
manipulate vast numbers of people with the new media and the new 
psychology. Even before the war the professionals had begun to adapt 
their publicity campaigns willy-nilly to these developments. 
As they refined their methods in the 1920s, they committed themselves 
increasingly to the communications revolution and commercial ethos that 
reached far out into American society at the time. Their efforts to in-
fluence the public moved rapidly toward the conscious manipulation of 
non-rational drives. The wrapped their messages in bright packages— 
cheerful tuberculosis films, happy smallpox posters—and marketed them 
as if they were peddling chewing gum and cigarettes. 
At the same time, they worked out a more complex notion of the 
public. For years they had perceived it as a more or less shapeless mass of 
individuals, but that perception yielded before a growing appreciation 
of group dynamics in an organizational society. This growing tendency 
toward group persuasion reinforced the manipulative aspects of social 
publicity, since the message was no longer inherent solely in the informa-
tion, but now as well in the groups at which the information was directed. 
Thus to round out his professional training the publicist had to famil-
iarize himself with social research, so that he could frame his message 
effectively in different ways for different groups. 
This process proceeded along similar lines among all of the new public 
professions. It was not isolated, it was not random, it was scarcely even 
controversial. On the contrary, it became an integral part of the efforts 
to move public opinion and was treated with respect in the various pro-
fessional organizations. By the 1920s each of the associations had added, 
under one name or another, a separate section on publicity. In the 
professional journals and at annual meetings these agencies furnished 
articles, papers and colloquia on publicity methods, reported on the 
publicity campaigns that were proliferating in the country, and designed 
courses on social publicity which they offered to the universities. Iron-
ically the professionals had come full circle. Their efforts to spread 
technical knowledge in non-technical terms had grown into a whole new 
field of expertise with its own cadre of technicians to administer it. 
And so the abrasive impulses of democracy and expertise were grad-
ually reconciled by the new marketing techniques of business enterprise 
in the early decades of the century. The professionals did not have things 
all their own way, of course, for if they found in advertising a means of 
access to power, their use of power was always restrained by an awareness 
of the next election. Nevertheless, in the end they succeeded in making 
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a nineteenth-century political system more relevant to their own vision 
of a twentieth-century America. Simon Fraser University 
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